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Abstract 
The International Criminal Court has generally a bad reputation in the African 
continent as a whole with hostile assertions by the African Union, that the court 
is nothing but a political tool for the powerful. The Court, plagued with numerous 
difficulties, has come under pressure to perform, with some doubting its viability. 
Created by the Rome Statute, and the parties therein governed by general treaty 
law, enforcement mechanisms of the court have been unsatisfactory at best and 
this has led to questions being asked as to its survival. There exists a pool of diver-
gent views, in regard to the African Union and the International Criminal Court, 
in many of the crucial areas of international criminal justice. This paper seeks to 
find out just how true is the claim that the ICC is ‘dead’ is, and the implications 
of this in the future of the continent as regards international criminal justice. How 
important is it for us to preserve international criminal justice? Just how much of 
a role do states play in this revered area of law? Is its legal viability coming to an 
unfortunate premature end? What does this mean, then, for the victims of mass 
atrocities? This paper seeks to show an interplay of the role of states and politics 
in international criminal justice, and determine then, whether there exists any 
bright future for this area of law in Africa. 
I. Introduction
International criminal justice, albeit plagued by numerous pitfalls, is one of  
the areas of  law that should be revered the world over.1 Its purpose is to ensure 
* The author is a student at the Strathmore University Law School in Nairobi, Kenya.
1 ‘Donovan D: “International Criminal Court: Successes and Failures’, International Policy Digest, 
http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2012/03/23/international-criminal-court-successes-and-
failures-of-the-past-and-goals-for-the-future/ on 25 November 2015.
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that those crimes considered to be of  a grave nature against the whole of  hu-
manity do not go unpunished.2 Indeed, the very first time in history that this area 
of  law was formally recognized was at the World War II trials at Nuremberg.3 
The basis of  the criminalisation and punishment of  the Nazi atrocities in the 
1930s was that the world could not tolerate their being ignored, because they could not toler-
ate their being repeated, and this was rightly said by Justice Robert H. Jackson, who 
was the then chief  prosecutor of  the United States at the Nuremberg trials.4 The 
importance of  international criminal justice cannot, therefore, be trivialized. In 
order to assess the future of  this crucial area of  law in our great continent, we 
need to have a sense of  its nature. It is important to note, notwithstanding, the 
vital nature of  this area of  law, that international criminal courts and tribunals 
acquire their power and legal mandate from many divergent sources, and this ul-
timately has the effect of  rendering their efficiency wanting.5 A close look at the 
International Criminal Court (herein after referred to as the ICC), vis-à-vis other 
types of  international criminal tribunals, as we shall see in the subsequent parts 
of  this paper, will demonstrate the exact extent of  this.
There are a number of  issues that have continued to haunt the international 
criminal law system, an important one being politics; politics, because of  the pri-
macy of  states in this branch of  law. The two areas have been viewed as separate 
for a long time but a look at international law happenings in history such as the 
case against Augusto Pinochet, the NATO intervention in Kosovo, the decision 
of  the Security Council not to intervene in the Rwandese genocide, the reluc-
tance of  the Security Council to intervene in Syria, or their standoff  as regards 
the war in Iraq or the war against terrorism as it is now, show close proximity 
between international law and politics.6 In the African context, much has been 
said about the reluctance of  judicial systems that are mostly partisan shielding 
those who ought to be in trial from the long hand of  the law. It has been said that 
2 See, Damasaka M, ‘What is the Point of  International Criminal Justice?’ Yale Law School legal scholar-
ship repository (2008).
3 International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. Also see, The London Declaration of  8 August 1945 
on the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of  Major War Criminals of  the European 
Axis.
4 See the statement by Justice Jackson in the opening address to the International Military Tribunal at 
the Nuremberg Trials, November 10, 1945, https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Robert_H._Jackson on 
28 November 2015.
5 There is no specific basis for the formation of  international criminal tribunals. The ICC for example 
was created by the Rome Statute and is a treaty-based court and the only permanent one. Others 
such as the ICTY and ICTR were formed on an ad hoc basis by the United Nations which makes 
aspects such as cooperation easier because they are governed by the Security Council.
6 Reus-Smit C, The Politics of  International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2004, 1.
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there are a number of  situations where political pressure may be too great even 
for national independent systems to deal with.7
International criminal tribunals have limited power beyond that which 
states accord them, because of  the basic reason that states are at the centre of  the 
formation of  such tribunals; this is true more so for the ICC, which is founded 
by treaty. They are dependent on the will of  the states, and therefore, the politi-
cal realities that plague this area of  law cannot be downplayed. Since states are at 
the apex of  this, political considerations and decisions, rather than purely legal 
and objective ones, regarding some of  the major issues in this area of  law, are 
prevalent. This has been said to be the reason why international criminal justice, 
since the World War II era, has been branded a system that promotes justice for 
the victors.8
As regards Africa, the application of  international criminal justice has re-
ceived blows from the majority of  countries for that same reason. The ICC has 
been said to unfairly target Africans, and this has been the stand formally taken 
by the African Union (herein after referred to as the AU).9 The AU has cited this 
as one of  the reasons why they passed a call to all of  their members not to co-
operate with the ICC.10 This view, that international criminal justice is lopsided, 
has contributed to its effectiveness owing to lack of  goodwill by member states.11 
This view has, however, not been adequately substantiated in the law, as many 
of  the criticisms tend to ignore the principle of  complementarity, and to give it 
credit. Also not taken into account are the various ways in which situations may 
be brought before the court under the Rome Statute. It is noteworthy that four 
cases in the ICC were referred to the court by African states themselves.12 While 
taking adequate consideration of  the fact that the views of  the whole continent 
of  Africa cannot be based on the views of  the AU as a whole since there is 
7 ‘Complementarity: A working relationship between African states and the International Criminal 
Court’ Max Du Plesis (2008), 137.
8 ‘Ottilia Anna Maunganidze: The Conflation of  Politics and Law: Africa and International Criminal 
Justice’ International Criminal Justice Today, 8 December 2014 http://www.international-criminal-justice-
today.org/arguendo/Article/the-conflation-of-politics-and-law-africa-and-international-criminal-justice/on 20 Au-
gust 2015.
9 AU, “Decision on the Progress Report of  the Commission on the Implementation of  Decision Assembly/AU/Dec. 
270 (XIV) on the Second Ministerial Meeting on the Rome Statute of  the International Criminal Court (ICC), ” 
27 July 2010, Assembly/AU/Dec.296 (XV).
10 AU, “Decision on the Progress Report of  the Commission on the Implementation of  Decision Assembly/AU/
Dec.270 (XIV) on the Second Ministerial Meeting on the Rome Statute of  the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
” 27 July 2010, Assembly/AU/Dec.296 (XV), para. 5, 8 and 9.
11 Donovan D, ‘International Criminal Court: Successes and Failures.’
12 Jacinto L, ‘From Lubanga to Kony: Is the ICC only for Africans?’ (2012), 24.
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evidence that some African countries in the union do not agree with the union’s 
stance, the effect of  this is that it has created a loophole for some to explore the 
uneven terrain and undermine the international criminal justice system.13
What, then, does this mean for the future of  the international criminal jus-
tice system in Africa? This paper sets out to break down the international crimi-
nal justice system in order to determine where Africa lies in the quest for justice 
for victims of  major atrocities committed on African soil vis-à-vis the need to 
uphold sovereignty as a principle of  international law. With particular regard to 
the ICC, an attempt will be made to study the key areas of  contention that con-
tinue to exist in the relationship it has with African countries. 
Part I of  this paper therefore focuses on the reasons why states are crucial 
players on the international criminal law scene and what certain principles such 
as sovereignty mean in relation to this. Part II will discuss the duties and obliga-
tions, in particular, cooperation, that states have towards the ICC as a treaty-
based court, and will contrast these with the duties and obligations that would 
arise from a state, if  the court had been of  the ad hoc or hybrid nature, such as 
those that get their powers from the United Nations. Part III of  the paper sets 
out an analysis of  the issue of  cooperation, in particular the discussion on im-
munities and arrest warrants, in relation to the continent and the ICC. Part IV 
sets out to break down and understand the nature of  the conflict of  interest as 
regards the states in Africa that are both party to the Rome Statute, and the AU 
and the solution to this. Part V gives the conclusion.
II. States as the Primary Actors in International Criminal Justice 
i International Legal Personality
International legal personality denotes rights, duties and obligations under 
international law. States remain by far the most important of  these in interna-
tional criminal justice.14 States are said to have original personality in international 
law, and even though with time there has been an increase in the entities that 
13 Reuters, Malone B, African nations divided over Bashir genocide charge, 25 July 2010. See http://
uk.reuters.com/Article/idUKTRE66O1NR20100725 on 12 August 2015. See also, as an example 
of  one of  the African Countries that did not agree with African Union; Botswana Press Agency, Bo-
tswana stands by the International Criminal Court, 2010. http://www.gov.bw/en/News/Botswana-
stands-by-the-International-Criminal-Court-/on 12 August 2015.
14 Shaw M, International Law, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2008, 195.
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have international legal personality under the law, states maintain the original 
legal personality while other entities have derivative legal personality. Although 
international criminal justice connotes individual responsibility, the main legal 
persons in this area of  law are states especially in regard to the practical function-
ality of  courts.15
Derivative legal personality under international law means that the states are 
the ones who give the meaning of  personality to other entities such as interna-
tional organizations as well as individuals. Other entities are limited in their rights 
and duties; that is, they do not enjoy absolute legal personality and are limited 
only to the extent of  the powers and functions that their constitutive documents, 
which the states formulate, give them. This was stated in the Reparations Case.16
ii Principles of Sovereignty and Complementarity
As set out in the Montevideo Convention, sovereignty is one of  the most 
important characteristics of  statehood.17 The International Law Commission 
defined sovereignty as the ability of  a state to provide for its own well-being 
independent of  the dominion of  other states.18 Sovereignty is the principle that a 
state has independence and autonomy in its functions, and that no other state can 
dictate the actions of  the state. Respect for state sovereignty is enshrined under 
the Rome Statute’s preamble in paragraph 10 which states that the court shall be 
complementary to national jurisdictions, and in Article 17 which provides that 
the court shall render a case inadmissible in the event of  it being investigated or 
prosecuted by a state which has the jurisdiction to do so.19 This complementa-
rity role means that a state bears the primary responsibility for investigating and 
prosecuting a case. It is only when the court has determined that a state is unable 
or unwilling to institute proceedings that it may interfere.20
15 Shaw, International Law, 197.
16 Reparation of  Injuries Suffered in service in the United Nations Case, Advisory Opinion, ICJ reports 1949.
17 Article 1, Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of  states, 26 December 1933.
18 See, the duties of  states prepared in 1949, by the International Law Commission in the Yearbook of  
the ILC, 1949, 286. See also, Judge Huber’s dicta in the Island of  Palmas case where he deals with the 
issue of  territorial sovereignty, and talks of  the right to the exclusion of  all others in the exercise of  
the functions of  a particular state.
19 Article 17, Rome Statute of  the International Criminal Court, 17 July1998, 2187 UNTS 3.
20 International Justice Project, Cuzzolino A, ‘Cooperating on Non-Cooperation: a brief  legal history and analy-
sis of  Sudan’s non-compliance with the ICC — and the role of  the Security Council’, 26 June 2015. http://
www.internationaljusticeproject.com/cooperating-on-non-cooperation-a-brief-legal-history-and-
analysis-of-sudans-non-compliance-with-the-icc-and-the-role-of-the-security-council on 20 August 
2015.
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III. States as the enforcement mechanisms of the International 
Criminal Court
The constitutive document of  the ICC is the Rome Statute. It is a treaty-
based court, the first permanent criminal court in the world, formed by the as-
sembly of  the state parties, for the purpose of  ending impunity with regard 
to international crimes.21 The court, however, does not have its own enforce-
ment mechanism and therefore depends heavily on the will of  states. It does this 
through cooperation requests, since under the Rome Statute, the state parties 
have a general obligation to cooperate with the court under Article 86, and the 
court may request cooperation of  state parties under Article 87.22 States have 
the obligation to cooperate with the court in the exercise of  its functions, in 
many areas such as the execution of  arrest warrants and enforcement of  prison 
sentences. A problematic situation is noted here, owing to the fact that the court 
cannot properly exercise its functions except as dependent on the will of  states. 
The ICC depends on state parties to cooperate, in order for it to exercise its 
powers. As we shall see (in the subsequent parts of  this paper), in the event of  
non-cooperation, there is only so much that the court can do although, to date, 
there have been no real punitive actions taken against any state for the refusal to 
fulfil obligations under the Rome Statute. 
We shall see, in the subsequent chapters, examples of  how the ICC is ac-
tually dependent on the goodwill of  states, and is essentially almost powerless 
without states. In Africa, for example, the court has struggled owing to non-
cooperation of  member states as seen in the situation regarding the execution 
of  the arrest warrant of  Omar Al Bashir. There is clearly only so much that the 
court can do, but ultimately the cooperation of  states is the only factor that holds 
the court together, lest it collapses.23 The court, as seen in many instances in the 
Bashir case, has tried to effectuate its powers by basing arguments in customary 
law and in the UN charter.24 However, it derives its powers from the Rome stat-
21 http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/about%20the%20court/Pages/about%20the%20court.
aspx on 16 August 2015.
22 Article 86, 87 Rome Statute of  the International Criminal Court. 
23 AU has told its members not to cooperate with the court. Also, see all the countries that have failed 
to honour their obligations under the Rome Statute, such as Malawi, Chad and the Democratic Re-
public of  Congo.
24 International Justice Project, Cuzzolino A, ‘Cooperating on Non-Cooperation: a brief  legal history and analysis 
of  Sudan’s non-compliance with the ICC — and the role of  the Security Council’, 26 June 2015. http://www.
internationaljusticeproject.com/cooperating-on-non-cooperation-a-brief-legal-history-and-analysis-
of-sudans-non-compliance-with-the-icc-and-the-role-of-the-security-council on 20 August 2015.
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ute, and cannot claim to correctly base its powers on custom, when the require-
ments for forming custom in public international law have not been met as seen 
in a number of  its decisions.25
 The situation may be different, with regard to entities such as the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for Rwanda, which get their powers from the United Nations as an 
extension of  the functions of  the Security Council; what remains, however, is 
the fact that the international legal persons who sit in the United Nations, and 
specifically the United Nations Security Council are states. States can therefore 
be said to have the front seat in international criminal justice, and are the crucial 
players in the formation of  international criminal courts and the application and 
enforcement of  international criminal law.
i. Divergence of state obligations in the international criminal court, 
the United Nations ad hoc tribunals and the hybrid courts
Antecedent to the formation of  the ICC, the international criminal tribu-
nals that existed were all ad hoc. This means that they were created to specifically 
address certain international law violations that had occurred at the (material) 
time of  their formation.26 These ad hoc tribunals are set up by the United Na-
tions Security Council, pursuant to the powers accorded in chapter VII of  the 
UN Charter.27 Examples of  these are the Nuremberg tribunals that were formed 
after World War II, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugo-
slavia (herein after referred to as the ICTY) that was formed after mass atroci-
ties were committed in the former Yugoslavia since 1991, and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (herein after referred to as the ICTR) after the 
1994 genocide that occurred in Rwanda. The ICTY and ICTR were established 
pursuant to the Security Council’s powers under chapter VII of  the UN Char-
ter.28 Special hybrid courts, such as the special tribunals for Sierra Leone and for 
25 Custom is created by both the objective element of  state practice and the subjective element of  
opinion juris, as per Article 38 of  the statute of  the International Court of  Justice.
26 International Justice Project, Cuzzolino A, ‘Cooperating on Non-Cooperation: a brief  legal history and analy-
sis of  Sudan’s non-compliance with the ICC — and the role of  the Security Council’, 26 June 2015. http://
www.internationaljusticeproject.com/cooperating-on-non-cooperation-a-brief-legal-history-and-
analysis-of-sudans-non-compliance-with-the-icc-and-the-role-of-the-security-council, 20 August 
2015.
27 Article 41, UN Charter. http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/subsidiary_organs/international_tri-
bunals.shtml on 12 August 2015. See also, Shaw, International Law, 399.
28 Shaw, International Law, 402, 407.
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Lebanon, although not formed by the United Nations charter, are formed in 
post-conflict situations where the domestic mechanisms for resolving the issue 
were not adequate.29 We then have the ICC, the first permanent court of  its kind 
that was established by treaty between the nations signatory to the Rome Statute. 
The purpose of  distinguishing these various types of  international criminal 
tribunals is to find out the cooperation structures they adopted, and, in contrast, 
the ones available to the ICC and the effects thereof. In the preceding part, 
we identified a particular challenge that the Court undergoes, with regards to 
cooperation, as it is entirely dependent on the will of  the state. This part seeks 
to outline the differences in terms of  cooperation structures that the different 
types of  international tribunals employ, and analyse the solutions that the ICC 
has adopted. Seeing as prima facie, it is clear that cooperation difficulties have 
plagued the court immensely. 
ii. Courts established by United Nations Security Council
The United Nations Security Council, pursuant to its powers under chapter 
VII of  the United Nation’s Charter, establishes judicial bodies that are formed 
for the purpose of  continuing its work of  maintaining peace and security the 
world over.30 Since the Security Council does not possess the power to perform 
judicial functions or, in this case, to exercise jurisdiction on individual criminal re-
sponsibility matters, it delegates some of  its powers to the international criminal 
tribunals that it creates, as was seen in the report by the Secretary General of  the 
United Nations to the Security Council.31 The Tadic case in the ICTY reiterated 
this power of  the Security Council.32
The mandate of  these international tribunals is to be further determined 
by chapter VII of  the UN Charter.33 The tribunals may also be given delegated 
powers by the Security Council. This means that their powers and functions 
may be from the charter expressly or implied whereby the council delegates its 
powers to the tribunals to perform judicial functions.34 Implied powers are those 
29 Shaw, International Law, 417.
30 Sarooshi D, Powers of  the United Nations Criminal Tribunals, Max Plank Year Book of  United Nations 
Law. See also, the United Nations Charter, Chap VII.
31 Report of  the Secretary-General pursuant to Paragraph 2 of  the Security Council resolution 808, 3 May 1993 UN 
Doc S/25704, 7.
32 Prosecutor v Tadic, ICTY, Case No. IT-94-1-T, 1997.
33 This is the express source of  power; i.e. that are granted by the United Nations Charter Chapter VII. 
There also exists implied powers that stem from the fact that they are judicial organs.
34 Reparations case, 47, 56-57. It was said here that the organization must have those powers conferred to 
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that are deemed to be necessary for the fulfilment of  their obligations as courts. 
This was set out in the advisory opinion by the International Court of  Justice 
in the case of  the reparation of  injuries suffered by the agents of  the United 
Nations.35
The tribunals established by the Security Council enjoy a certain level of  
independence and autonomy over their actions and decisions, because of  the 
judicial functions conferred on them. The Security Council in practice does not 
interfere or review the court’s decisions, because in this case it would be per-
forming judicial functions, which it has no power to do. The Security Council’s 
mandate is to form these judicial bodies, as seen earlier, and not to perform these 
functions itself. The independence that is enjoyed by these bodies assists in the 
adequate and efficient performance of  the functions of  the court. Although they 
also depend on their situation countries for cooperation, the obligation to coop-
erate stems directly from the Security Council’s delegated power and is then eas-
ier to enforce. When the ICTY was being formed, the Secretary General stated 
that the court should be enabled to perform its specific functions, independent 
of  the political considerations of  the Security Council, and it was not subject to 
the command of  the Council.36 This aspect of  independence is crucial for the 
functions of  the court. The decisions that the courts give are also binding on all 
states, by virtue of  the fact that the Security Council delegated that power, and, 
therefore, these could be said to be the decisions of  the council itself  in this way. 
The Security Council has the powers to issue resolutions binding upon all states 
under Article 25 of  the UN Charter.37 In this way any delegated function can be 
deemed their own and thus binding upon all states. 
There exists in international law the principle, par in parei, non habet imperium, 
that among equals, none has dominion over the others.38 This stems from the 
principle of  sovereignty. There is an exception to this rule as regards the powers 
of  the Security Council, particularly in relation to cooperation. The aspect of  
the extended powers of  the Security Council to the court, flows to the issue of  
cooperation. The obligation of  states to cooperate is outlined in Article 29 of  
it that are absolutely necessary for the fulfilment of  the functions. The purpose of  an organisation 
can give rise to its implied rights and duties. 
35 Reparation case, 174.
36 UN, Report of  the Secretary-General pursuant to Paragraph 2 of  the Security Council resolution 808, 1993. 
37 Article 25, UN Charter. The member states are to accept in all ways and execute the decisions of  the 
Security Council, and subsidiary organs as long as the scope of  powers transferred by the Security 
Council is strictly observed.
38 Encyclopaedic Dictionary of  International Law, 3ed, Oxford University Press, 2009.
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the Charter, and in particular to the ICTY, in paragraph 4 of  the Security Council 
resolution that formed it.39 Since binding force arises from Article 29, the provi-
sions of  Chapter VII, as well as statutes of  the tribunals, then the obligations of  
each member state to cooperate, is binding upon all. The duty to offer judicial as-
sistance and cooperate with the court is therefore compulsory, and no derogation 
can be permitted. This therefore ascertains that the cooperation requests made 
by the court(s) are to be binding.40 The ICTY in the Blaskic Subpoena case, however, 
mentioned that when there was a requirement by the courts that documents be 
produced, they must be of  a specific nature.41
The last issue regards the situation in which there would be a conflict of  ob-
ligations to cooperate with the courts, and another treaty-based obligation. Since 
the courts are established by the UN, this issue is dealt with by the UN Charter, 
which provides in Article 103, that, in the event of  conflict, the obligations under 
the UN Charter shall trump those of  the other treaty. The statutes of  both the 
ICTY and ICTR, as seen here, contain provisions of  mandatory cooperation, 
because they were created by the Security Council.42
iii. Hybrid courts
Although the dynamics and practice surrounding Special Hybrid Tribunals 
is relevant to the discussion on international criminal tribunals, for the purposes 
of  this paper we shall limit our discussion to the other types of  courts, but shall 
nonetheless discuss it in small detail. The special courts are not created by the 
United Nations under the charter but as mentioned in the introduction, they are 
created as an agreement by the United Nations and specific countries, as was 
the case in Sierra Leone. The state obligation mechanisms used by these special 
tribunals are those that involve getting into special treaties with the countries in-
volved. The Sierra Leone court executed treaties with the countries involved; so 
did the Lebanon tribunal, although it was seen to only enter into a memorandum 
39 UNSC S/RES/827 (1992) Establishment of  ICTY, para 4.
40 Prosecutor v Tihomir Blaskic, Judgement on the request of  the Republic of  Croatia for review of  the 
decision of  Trial chamber 11, 1997, Para 26.
41 Frowein J.A and Zimmerman A, ‘Amicus Curiae in Blaskic Subpoena Case before appeals chamber’, 
Max Plank Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law.
42 It is important to note however, that earlier courts established by the United Nations such as the 
Nuremberg Tribunals, and the Tokyo Tribunal, did not give rise to the issue of  cooperation, because 
the trials were conducted when the suspects were already in custody, and therefore the court need 
not ask for states to cooperate. 
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of  understanding with Lebanon itself.43 These special treaties executed between 
the courts and the countries involved are an effective way to enforce state ob-
ligation, since it is a general rule, under the Vienna Convention on the Law of  
Treaties that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be 
performed by them in good faith.44
iv. The International Criminal Court
The issue of  state obligation, and in particular the obligations of  states 
to cooperate with the court, is one that has in recent years threatened to com-
pletely terminate the life of  the ICC. With regard to the continent, questions 
have been raised on the viability of  the court and whether the court will be able 
to effectively exercise its functions, without adequate cooperation by the states. 
This takes us back to one of  the demerits of  having states as primary actors in 
international criminal tribunals, more so, for the ICC. Part III of  this paper will 
extensively deal with the specific issues of  the state’s obligation, that is, the issue 
of  the obligations of  states party to the Rome Statute to execute arrest warrants 
that are issued by the court. There has been a conflict of  obligations, in relation 
to this issue, with one of  the questions asked being whether the Rome Statute is 
airtight in its provision (as regards this issue). 
It is important to outline clearly the differences between the obligations 
that arise from the Rome Statute and the obligations that arise from the United 
Nations Charter and Security Council resolutions. To do this, this paper will 
analyse the various provisions of  the Rome Statute in regard to state obligations. 
As a preliminary point, it is paramount to this discussion that it is reiterated that 
the ICC was established by the Rome Statute and not the United Nations. The 
fact that it was not formed by the United Nations is a starting point, to the clear 
demarcation of  state obligations that arise. All parties to a treaty are under an 
obligation to perform in good faith their duties under that treaty. This is the 
principle of  Pacta Sunt Servanda that is provided for by the Vienna Convention 
on the law of  treaties, in Article 26. This means that the treaty is binding in 
force, and every state party to it has an obligation to perform its duties in good 
43 International Justice Project, Cuzzolino A, ‘Cooperating on Non-Cooperation: a brief  legal history and analy-
sis of  Sudan’s non-compliance with the ICC — and the role of  the Security Council’, 26 June 2015. http://
www.internationaljusticeproject.com/cooperating-on-non-cooperation-a-brief-legal-history-and-
analysis-of-sudans-non-compliance-with-the-icc-and-the-role-of-the-security-council on 20 August 
2015.
44 Article 26, Vienna Convention on the Law of  Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331. 
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faith,45 as well as not to defeat the purposes of  the treaty, under Article 18 of  
the VCLT.46
Having noted that the obligations that states have under a treaty are binding 
in force, the paper will set out to analyse the Rome Statute provisions applicable. 
Article 86 provides the general obligations of  state parties to cooperate fully with 
the court in the investigation and prosecution of  crimes, as well as in any other 
form as outlined by Article 93.47 The court has the powers to request cooperation 
from any state party, failure to which, the court may make a finding, and refer the 
matter to the Assembly of  State Parties (ASP); or where the matter was brought 
into the court’s attention by the Security Council, it may refer it to the Security 
Council.48 Despite the fact that the refusal of  a state to cooperate with the court 
hinders the court from exercising its powers and functions, contrary to the pro-
visions of  the statute, there is no mention of  what exactly would constitute an 
action that the ASP or the Security Council could take.49
As regards non-state parties, the court may invite the state to provide assis-
tance to the court, on an ad hoc basis through an agreement with the state. The 
court also takes the same actions that it takes on state parties, in the event that 
the state fails to comply with the court; that is, refer the matter to the ASP or the 
Security Council where applicable.50
State obligation to assist the court may take different forms, such as the 
obligation of  a state party to surrender persons to the Court, under Article 89.51 
This obligation to arrest a person whom an arrest warrant attaches, has been the 
bone of  contention recently, especially in regard to the request for the arrest of  
Omar al Bashir, which many African countries have failed to honour.52 There are, 
however, various other ways in which states are obligated to assist the court.53
45 Article 26, Vienna Convention on the Law of  Treaties.
46 Article 18, Vienna Convention on the Law of  Treaties. This, however, relates to the point where the treaty 
has been signed, but not ratified, or where the treaty is yet to come into force. It could, however, still 
be used as a persuasive argument. 
47 Article 86 and 93, Rome Statute of  the International Criminal Court.
48 Article 87 (1) (2), Rome Statute of  the International Criminal Court.
49 Article 87(7), Rome Statute of  the International Criminal Court.
50 Article 87 (5) (b), Rome Statute of  the International Criminal Court.
51 Article 89, Rome Statute of  the International Criminal Court.
52 Non-cooperation decisions have been issued by the ICC against Malawi, Chad and the DRC. The 
decision in respect of  Kenya is pending.
53 Article 93, Rome Statute of  the International Criminal Court, which outlines all the various forms of  
cooperation. The identification and whereabouts of  persons; the taking of  evidence, including tes-
timony under oath, and the production of  evidence, expert opinions and reports necessary to the 
Court, facilitating the voluntary appearance of  persons as witnesses or experts before the Court, as 
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An important provision, which will form a large part of  the discussion in 
part III, is Article 98, which is on cooperation with respect to immunity and con-
sent to surrender. Under this provision, the court shall not proceed to request the 
surrender of  an accused or assistance thereof, when the requested state would 
have to act inconsistently with its obligations under international law with respect 
to diplomatic immunity of  a person of  another state, unless the court can gain 
a waiver of  that immunity from that state.54 When the third state does not give 
consent for the surrender of  a person, the court should not proceed with the 
request for surrender, since this would be make the state act inconsistently with 
its obligations under international law. This has formed the crux of  the debate 
between the AU and the ICC, as regards the arrest of  Sudanese President Omar 
al Bashir.55
Here, a conflict in the two provisions of  the Rome Statute stated above 
is seen, whereby the obligation of  a state to cooperate with the court is clearly 
outlined, but then comes a provision which states that the court may not proceed 
with a request for cooperation where the requested state would have to act incon-
sistently with its obligations under international law. With regard to the specific 
issue of  arrest warrants, these two provisions pose a difficulty in the analysis of  
the law. 
In conclusion, on analysis of  state obligations that accrue from the United 
Nations tribunals, and those that come from the Rome Statute, it would not be 
far-fetched to state that the obligations to cooperate with the ad hoc tribunals 
are weightier because of  their constitutive documents as well as the fact that 
these tribunals have primacy over national proceedings while the ICC has com-
plementary jurisdiction.56 Although the Rome Statute, being a treaty, gives the 
obligations to all state parties to perform their duties in good faith; in the case 
of  conflict between it, and any other treaty, it is not clear what agreement should 
trump the other. Furthermore, upon a request by the court for a state to cooper-
ate that will make a state act in contravention of  its international law obligations, 
the court shall withdraw such a request, in addition to the fact that the state so 
requested shall not be bound to perform its obligations to comply. In contrast, 
the tribunals formed by the Security Council have more binding obligations. This 
in Kenya’s situation; the execution of  searches and seizures and the protection of  victims and pres-
ervation of  evidence.
54 Article 98(1), Rome Statute of  the International Criminal Court.
55 African Union, Motion on cooperation with the ICC, Assembly/AU/Dec, 243-267.
56 Article 17, Rome Statute of  the International Criminal Court.
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is because, pursuant to the United Nations Charter, the Security Council may 
make binding resolutions on all state parties.57 By virtue of  the Security Council’s 
delegation of  powers to the tribunals, the tribunal’s decisions are therefore con-
sidered as the council’s own, and therefore just as binding on all states. In addi-
tion to this, the UN Charter specifically provides that in the event of  a conflict of  
obligations between that of  the Charter and that of  another treaty, the provisions 
of  the charter shall supersede. 
It is sufficient to say that there is need for the amendment of  the Rome 
statute so that the provisions are clearer and therefore the obligations are con-
strued as mandatory in order to allow for the effective functioning of  the Court. 
The lack of  clarity in the statute as regards the issue of  state obligations to 
cooperate with the ICC creates up a slippery slope effect, where instances of  
states failing to comply occur every now and then, as is evident in the practice 
of  the court.58
IV. Cooperation of African countries in the ICC
The ICC’s image in Africa has been characterised by numerous dissatisfac-
tions in the workings of  the court.59 This has been due to the position that most 
African countries hold, that the court targets African leaders and is not based 
on an objective manner of  pursuing situations of  conflict, but is rather guided 
by political considerations.60 Perhaps if  the court instituted proceedings in other 
situations outside Africa, the image of  the court in the continent’s eye would 
improve. Indeed, questions somewhat valid in their own right have been raised 
as to why situations in Palestine, the United States’ conduct in Iraq, and many 
other such conflict-ridden situations have not been taken up the ICC, or why the 
Security Council has not taken any actions pertaining to these. 
57 Article 24, UN Charter.
58 Botswana, Chad, Central African Republic, China, Democratic Republic of  Congo, Djibouti, Ethi-
opia, Egypt, Eritrea, France, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Kuwait, Libya, Malawi, Malaysia, Nigeria, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Sudan, Turkey, Uganda, Zambia  See, Bashir Travel Map http://
bashirwatch.org/. On 21 August 2015.
59 ‘Bosco D: Time for the African Union to choose a Path’ International Criminal Justice Today, 8 De-
cember 2014. http://www.international-criminal-justice-today.org/arguendo/Article/time-for-the-
african-union-to-choose-a-path/on 13 August 2015.
60 African Union, Motion on cooperation with the ICC. Assembly/AU/Dec. 243-267 (XIII). The formal 
position stems from the various decisions by the AU as regards the matter. 
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International tribunals are in many ways the power play table of  many 
powerful countries. Political realities within the realm of  the functioning of  the 
courts, in particular the ICC, need to be acknowledged for what they are.61 It is 
not, however, within the scope of  this chapter to discuss the reasons and analyse 
these claims, but this (nonetheless) gives a very good basis of  understanding 
the discontent that the African continent as a whole has towards the ICC. 
Oversimplifying the views of  the continent by just looking at the stand of  the 
AU has been discouraged, however.62 States such as Botswana, as well as many 
other African states party to the Rome Statute as earlier seen, have publicly raised 
concerns over the declarations of  the AU, citing their continued support for the 
ICC.63 
The AU has, however, threatened to withdraw from the Rome Statute, 
although this claim has not materialized, and will probably not in the coming 
years.64 The reality still remains however, that there is adequate precedent showing 
the continued prevalence in prioritizing African cases over others because of  the 
politics that plague the world we live in. The court has clearly avoided taking up 
cases that will implicate powerful nations. Even so, African states, and in large 
numbers, have signed on to the Rome Statute, which has exposed them to many 
legal implications and cannot use deceptive and subjective non-legal arguments 
for their dissatisfaction with the court. 
In addition to the claims by the AU that the ICC is a political tool of  the 
powerful and is unfairly targeting African states, there come about different 
positions as regards many issues such as those of  state sovereignty, immunities 
applicable to heads of  states and the general duty to cooperate with the Rome 
Statute. A prevalent position of  the AU is that sitting heads of  state still enjoy 
immunity even for international crimes, and this will form a major part of  our 
61 ‘Bensouda F: ISS Seminar: Setting the record straight: the ICC’s new Prosecutor responds to African 
concerns’ ISS, 10 October 2012 http://www.issafrica.org/eventitem.php?EID=864 on 16 August 
2015. 
62 ‘Bosco D: Time for the African Union to choose a Path’ International Criminal Justice Today.
63 ‘Kersten M: Backing the ICC: Why Botswana stands alone amongst AU States’ http://justicein-
conflict.org/2013/06/13/backing-the-icc-why-botswana-stands-alone-amongst-au-states/ on 25 
November 2015.
 Examples of  other states in support of  the ICC, are Madagascar, Senegal, Malawi and Nigeria. See 
Human Rights Watch, ‘Memorandum to African States Parties of  the International Criminal Court for the 
Assembly of  States Parties 14th Session’, 17 December 2015. https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/11/17/
memorandum-african-states-parties-international-criminal-court-assembly-states on 28 November 
2015.
64 AU Assembly, Decision on International Jurisdiction, Justice and the International Criminal Court (ICC) Doc. 
Assembly/AU/13(XXI) adopted at the 21st ordinary session held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 2013.
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discussion. The ICC has a number of  times, in a somewhat clumsy way, rejected 
this argument citing customary law among other authorities. A detailed discussion 
of  this issue is to be carried out in this chapter.65
The conflict between African states and the ICC arose when the ICC pros-
ecutor issued an arrest warrant for Omar Al Bashir. In 2008, the AU through its 
Peace and Security Council requested that the proceedings against Al Bashir be 
suspended. In 2009, the AU made a decision which was majorly orchestrated by 
Muammar Gadaffi, which called on the member states of  the AU, notably all 
African countries, to refuse to cooperate with the court, by virtue of  Article 98 
of  the statute.66 
Pursuant to the persistence of  states party to the Rome Statute and to the 
AU, when the Union met in Kampala in 2010, it dropped the hostile wording of  
its declaration, while still maintaining its position. However, it provided that those 
states party to the AU and the Rome Statute should balance their obligations to 
the AU with their obligations to the ICC.67 The act of  ‘balancing’ obligations in 
this sense can be taken to mean that while the African nations uphold their duties 
towards countries such as Sudan, as stipulated in Article 98 of  the statute, they 
should at the very least make sure that persons against whom arrest warrants 
have been issued such as Bashir should not step into their countries. 
Kenya, Chad and Djibouti had at this time hosted President Bashir, in a 
couple of  situations, in complete contravention of  their duties and obligations 
under the Rome Statute. The AU then reaffirmed its position, by stating that the 
acts of  Kenya and the rest were pursuant to Article 23 of  the constitutive Act 
of  the African Union.68 There have been other arguments that some countries, 
particularly Chad, which was in conflict with Sudan but had just recently got out 
of  it, were acting for reasons of  maintaining peace and stability in their regions.69 
The ICC on several occasions issued various decisions regarding the non-coop-
eration in various African countries such as Chad, Malawi and the Democratic 
65 In international law, there exists a general rule that there is no immunity for crimes of  an interna-
tional nature, such as war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. The Rome statute contains 
this provision in Article 27, but it is contradicted in Article 98. 
66 The AU has a membership of  all 54 African countries. See, http://au.int/en/countryprofiles on 28 
November 2015. 
67 Plessis M and Gerves C, ‘Balancing Competing Obligations: The Rome Statute and AU decisions’ 
Institute for Security Studies, (2011).
68 Article 23, Constitutive Act of  the African Union. 
69 Plessis M and Gerves C, ‘Balancing Competing Obligations: The Rome Statute and AU decisions’ 
Institute for Security Studies, 2011. 
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Republic of  Congo (DRC) for failure to comply with the arrest warrant execu-
tion obligation of  Omar al Bashir.70
The Kenyan situation that was brought about proprio motu by the then ICC 
prosecutor Louis Moreno Ocampo also brought about a number of  issues with 
regard to the relationship between the court and the AU.71 Issues such as the 
prosecution of  a sitting head of  state have arisen, and some changes to the ICC 
rules of  Procedure and Evidence to relieve defendants, for example, a head of  
state from being present during the subsistence of  the trial, have all arisen from 
the Kenyan situation.72
i. Immunities in the International Criminal Court:  
The Article 27 and 98 debate
The two contentious provisions that have formed the basis of  the debate 
of  the existence of  conflict between the African Union and the ICC are Article 
27 of  the Rome Statute as well as Article 98. It is important that before reconcil-
ing the two provisions, and forming an argument as concerns immunity, they be 
separately analysed. 
a) Immunities under Article 27
It is a general principle of  domestic law that heads of  states, heads of  gov-
ernment and ministers of  foreign affairs have the privilege of  enjoying certain 
immunities from prosecution.73 However, the practice of  international criminal 
law precludes any such immunities in respect of  war crimes, crimes against hu-
manity and genocide. These are among the crimes that the ICC has jurisdiction 
over. In Article 27 of  the Rome statute states that the statute shall apply without 
any distinction and that official capacity, in particular, that of  a head of  state, 
will not exempt any person from criminal responsibility, nor shall it constitute a 
ground for the reduction of  a sentence.74 This Article clearly precludes immuni-
70 ‘Bosco D: Time for the African Union to choose a Path’ International Criminal Justice Today, 8 De-
cember 2014 http://www.international-criminal-justice-today.org/arguendo/Article/time-for-the-
african-union-to-choose-a-path/ on 13 August 2015.
71 The Kenyan situation was the first proprio motu situation in the ICC. Also first prosecution of  a 
sitting head of  state.
72 Assembly of  State Parties to the Rome Statute, Resolution adopted at the 12th plenary meeting, on 27th 
November 2013, ICC-ASP/12/Res 7, 53. https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/
ASP12/ICC-ASP-12-Res7-ENG.pdf  on 28 November 2015.
73 Arrest Warrants Case, (DRC v Belgium) Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2002, 36.
74 Article 27, Rome Statute of  the International Criminal Court.
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ties of  heads of  state or government from the jurisdiction of  the court. It should 
be noted then that this Article concerns immunities before the court, and should 
be distinguished from Article 98 which is discussed below. 
Contention has arisen, however, as to the applicability of  Article 27. It is 
argued that Article 27 does not apply to non-state parties to the ICC. This was 
pointed out by the AU in its non-cooperation decision.75 A contrary argument 
has been put forward, that even though the Article is not applicable to non-state 
parties, that in respect of  countries such as Sudan, there are still no applicable 
immunities.76 This is first and foremost because of  the fact that the situation in 
Sudan was referred to the court by the Security Council under resolution 1593. 
Because the Security Council chose to refer the situation to the court, it can be 
logically presumed that it expected an initiation of  investigation and prosecution 
thereof. The fact that this can be presumed, also logically implies that the Securi-
ty Council removed all immunities applicable to Sudan by virtue of  this, in order 
to enable the court to function without any restraints in handling the Darfur situ-
ation.77 The second reason why the immunities that might attach to Al Bashir no 
longer attached to him is by virtue of  the fact that the Security Council resolution 
expressly places Sudan under an obligation to cooperate fully with the court.78 
By virtue of  this, it reasonably expects that Sudan should waive the immunity of  
Al Bashir in accordance with the provisions of  the Security Council resolution. 
b) Immunities under Article 98
The immunity under Article 98 is immunity in respect of  states vis-à-vis 
states. There is a general international law duty that states owe each other, that is 
to provide immunity to heads of  states in their territories.79 Article 98(1) of  the 
Rome Statute is with respect to waiver of  immunity and consent to surrender. 
Under the Article, the court may not proceed with a request for surrender or 
assistance, which would require the requested state to act inconsistently with its 
75 African Union, Decision of  the Meeting of  African States Parties to the Rome Statute of  the International Crimi-
nal Court (ICC) UN Doc Assembly/AU/13(XIII) , 3 July 2009, para 10.
76 ‘Bosco D: Time for the African Union to choose a Path’ International Criminal Justice Today, 8 De-
cember 2014 http://www.international-criminal-justice-today.org/arguendo/Article/time-for-the-
african-union-to-choose-a-path/. On 13 August 2015.
77 ‘Gevers C: The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber’s Non-Cooperation Decision on Malawi’ War and Law, 16 
Feb 2012, http://warandlaw.blogspot.co.ke/2012/02/icc-pre-trial-chambers-non-cooperation.html 
on 20 August 2015.
78 Pre-trial Chamber of  the International Criminal Court, Decision requesting observations about Omar Al-
Bashir’s recent visit to Malawi in October 2011, ICC-02/0501/09.
79 Article 29-36, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 18 April 1961, 500 UNTS 95.
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obligations under international law, with respect to the state or diplomatic im-
munity of  a person or property of  a third state.80
The question then arises, as to whether if  states comply with the request of  
the ICC in respect of  Al Bashir’s arrest, they would be acting inconsistently with 
any obligation owed to Sudan. Article 27, in as much as it addresses immunities 
before the court, does not also preclude immunities under customary interna-
tional law that Al Bashir enjoys vis-à-vis other states. The formulation of  Article 
98 foresees this contingency and therefore provides that the court shall not con-
tinue with such a request if  the state has any such obligation. This has been the 
basis of  the AU’s arguments in favour of  its members not complying with the 
request by the ICC to arrest Omar Al Bashir. A simple argument in favour of  
the ICC would be that the resolution by the Security Council, stripped Al Bashir 
of  immunities before the Court, and therefore arguably stripped any obligations 
that he had vis-à-vis other states. This would be a good argument when using the 
doctrine of  effective construction, but otherwise would be incomplete.81
When looked at keenly, the wording of  the Security Council’s resolution is 
wanting. It only gives an express obligation to Sudan to cooperate but otherwise 
only merely ‘urges’ all other states concerned and their regional counterparts to 
cooperate fully with the court.82 The lack of  mandatory wording in the resolu-
tion, in respect of  cooperation, leads to a lack of  clarity in the issue. It therefore 
does not override Article 98, which implies that there exists diplomatic immunity, 
but rather acts as a persuasive provision.
Nevertheless, there are arguments that tend to water down the effect of  
Article 98 which the pre-trial chamber issued, although a number of  difficulties 
are deduced with these. The first argument by the court is that, under customary 
international law, immunities are non-existent in international tribunals.83 The 
pre-trial chamber of  the ICC, in dealing with the issue of  Malawi’s non-coop-
eration, stated that dating back to the post-World War II period, immunities for 
government leaders and officials was always denied, with no deviation given to 
this stand. Most of  the pre-trial chamber’s examples that showed the non-exist-
80 Article 98(1), Rome Statute of  the International Criminal Court.
81 Doctrine of  effective construction precludes the interpretation of  an Article of  the law that renders 
other parts of  it inapplicable. It is the doctrine, that ‘the thing may rather have effect than be de-
stroyed. See Langan P, Maxwell on Statutory Interpretation, 12 ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1969, 45.
82 UNSC S/RES 1593 (2005) Resolution with regards to the report of  the inquiry into human rights 
violations in Darfur, 1.
83 Pre-trial Chamber of  the International Criminal Court, Decision requesting observations about Omar Al-
Bashir’s recent visit to Malawi in October 2011, ICC-02/0501/09.
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ence of  immunities were faulty on their own. The chamber cited among others, 
the Statute of  the International Military Tribunal, the Tokyo Tribunal, the ICTR 
AND ICTY statutes, the Arrest Warrants case by the ICJ and the 1919 commis-
sion on the responsibility of  the Authors of  War and on Enforcement of  Penal-
ties.84 Take for example the 1919 Commission on the Responsibility of  Authors 
of  War, where the German Emperor Wilhelm II, who was to be on trial, was not 
an emperor at the time that the commission wrote the report. This renders the 
use of  this as compelling evidence of  the preclusion of  immunities in custom-
ary international law insufficient to a certain extent. The only viable source of  
this custom named by the pre-trial chamber was the decision in the ICJ of  the 
Arrest Warrants case. It should also be noted that since the issue in this case was 
discussed in passing, one can argue that it does not sufficiently address the issue 
of  immunities vis-à-vis other states as contemplated by Article 98.85 However, 
the belief  on the arrest warrants case was well placed. 
The second argument given by the court regarding the inapplicability of  
Article 98 is still related to custom, but will be analysed from a different tangent. 
The ICC Pre-trial chamber seems to formulate the argument that since Post-
World War II, there has been formation of  custom. The argument for the forma-
tion of  custom here is somehow faulty, as it takes into account only the objective 
element of  practice, but fails to take into account the subjective element, as ex-
pressed by Shaw, that is the element of  Opinio Juris Necessitas.86 This is the element 
of  a state behaving the way it behaves, because it has a legal obligation to do so. 
The two, state practice and opinio juris, form custom.87 The court does not take 
this into account in deciding that immunity does not exist because of  customary 
international law. 88 Some writers have termed this the ‘cheerleader effect’, which 
is the court’s way of  trying to prove something, when they don’t have a case.89
The pre-trial chamber, according to this analysis, should not have taken into 
account the provision of  Article 27. Article 27 clearly precludes the existence of  
84 ‘Jacobs D: Does South Africa have an obligation to arrest and surrender Bashir to the ICC? No,’ 
Spreading the jam, 14 June 2015, http://dovjacobs.com/2015/06/14/does-south-africa-have-an-obli-
gation-to-arrest-and-surrender-bashir-to-the-icc-no/ on 20 August 2015. 
85 Arrest Warrants Case, (DRC v Belgium), 36.
86 Shaw, International law, 72.
87 Article 38, Statute of  the International Court of  Justice. 
88 See, Shaw, International law, on the criteria for formation of  custom. 
89 Jacobs D, ‘A Sad Hommage to Antonio Cassese: The ICC’s confused pronouncements on State 
Compliance and Head of  State Immunity’ Spreading the jam, 15 December (2011), http://dovjacobs.
com/2011/12/15/a-sad-hommage-to-antonio-cassese-the-iccs-confused-pronouncements-on-
state-compliance-and-head-of-state-immunity/ on 21 August 2015.
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immunity in respect to those crimes mentioned in the Rome Statute; therefore, 
in that case, Al Bashir did not have immunity as regards the jurisdiction of  the 
court over the matter. The real issue, was the issue of  the immunities Al Bashir 
had in relation to other states, and whether those existed. It is to be noted that 
the chamber put down a superfluous argument that because the states ratified 
Article 27 the provisions of  Article 98 did not apply. The chamber sets this out, 
as if  to say that the states did not also ratify Article 98. This kind of  interpreta-
tion renders Article 98 void, which would be misleading.90
In conclusion, it is important to note the solutions that could be taken to 
address the issue of  cooperation. At the very least in relation to the situations 
referred to the ICC by the Security Council, in order to make the obligations un-
der the Rome Statute binding, the Security Council needs to adopt a more clear 
mandatory wording of  its resolutions, so that no derogation from this is permit-
ted. The fact that, for example, in the Darfur situation, the council merely ‘urged’ 
states to cooperate with the court shows the inefficiencies brought about by the 
ambiguity in its resolutions. If  in these instances the Security Council is to assist 
the court, it should adopt strict and, if  possible, punitive measures regarding the 
situations it refers to. 
V. Conflict of interests between the ICC and the African union
Stemming from all the legal complexities cited in the above part, it is 
important to discuss the issue of  the conflict of  obligations that have occurred 
with regard to the ICC. The AU has cited Article 98 as the basis of  its stance. The 
ICC, on the other hand, has on many occasions tried to water down the effect 
of  Article 98 and has argued on the basis of  Article 27 and custom. On the face 
of  it, it is not difficult to see the complexities this issue brings, especially for the 
states that are party to the Rome Statute, while still party to the African Union. 
It is to be noted that some African countries have continually changed their 
position as regards cooperation with the court for various reasons, political or 
not. We see, for example, a change in Chad’s position, from that of  not cooper-
90 ‘Tladji D: The ICC Decisions on Chad and Malawi on Cooperation, Immunities and Article 98’, 
Oxford Journal of  International Criminal Jutsice, (2013), 119-221. See also, Jacobs D, ‘Does South Africa 
have an obligation to arrest and surrender Bashir to the ICC? No’ Spreading the Jam, 14 June (2015).
 http://dovjacobs.com/2015/06/14/does-south-africa-have-an-obligation-to-arrest-and-surrender-
bashir-to-the-icc-no/ on 21 August 2015.
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ating with the ICC, to the one it holds now, that it shall cooperate in every way 
possible. It is noted that initially, in relation to the situation in Darfur, Chad had 
refused to cooperate with the court, due to the peace and stability they achieved 
after a long conflict. It was then in Chad’s and Sudan’s best interests, it reiter-
ated, for it not to cooperate with the court. After a change in regime, when a 
new head of  state came in, Chad then publicly backed the ICC, and vowed to 
arrest Al Bashir if  he came into their territory. This was seen as a play of  politics, 
whereby the reason for Chad’s position was so that the new government would 
gain favour with the international community as a whole.91 Malawi is seen to 
have changed from a period of  willingness to cooperate, to one where it cites 
its obligations to the AU as its reason for non-cooperation. There are states, for 
instance Kenya and South Africa, who in a number of  situations have been seen 
to be in contravention with their obligations under the statute, while showing a 
clear demarcation between the stand of  their judiciaries and the executive arms 
of  government.92
The divergence in opinions between the AU and the court exists in a num-
ber of  issues, as seen above, such as sovereignty of  the state, the obligations that 
arise from the statute, the issues of  the need of  a head of  state to be present in 
proceedings of  the trial, and the immunity of  heads of  state. The AU has issued 
a number of  non-cooperation declarations with the ICC, in a number of  situ-
ations, urging its member states not to comply with the requests of  assistance 
by the court. The AU has also stated that it will move to the ICJ, for the court 
to determine the issue. To date it hasn’t done so. Just recently, the AU issued a 
statement, threatening to withdraw from the Court,93 all this while the ICC issues 
non-cooperation decisions against some African countries. In late August 2015, 
the appeals chamber reversed the trial chamber’s decision in refusing to grant a 
non-cooperation finding in respect of  Kenya.
It is clear that there is a conflict of  interest in obligations. Where, then, does 
the balance lie? Which obligations trump which? The ICC had made a finding, 
91 Huffington Post, Mariana Pareja, Chad must cooperate with the International Criminal Court, http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/mariana-rodriguez-pareja/icc-indictee-in-chad-why-_b_2696582.html on 25 
November 2015.
92 ICJ Kenya, African civil society urges African States Parties to the Rome Statute to reaffirm their commitment, 
2009, 30. https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/07/30/african-civil-society-urges-african-states-parties 
Rome-statute-reaffirm-there on 25 November 2015.
93 Letter to ICC States Parties Ministers of  Justice and Ministers of  Foreign Affairs on the establish-
ment of  an International Criminal Court liaison office in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 2009. http://www.
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where it stated that it recognized the assertions of  the AU. However, it sought 
to then declare that the Union’s declarations were not viable because they were 
inconsistent with the statute, and only relied on Article 98 of  the Rome Statute. 
It should be noted that this is essentially false, because the legal validity of  the 
AU’s declarations is not dependent on its following the Rome Statute, as it is an 
organization of  its own, and not party to the Rome Statute.94
This paper takes the position of  the AU in its first non-cooperation deci-
sion as regards this matter and, as stated previously in this paper, when there 
exists a conflict of  obligation between that of  the states, that are parties to the 
AU, and also parties to the Rome Statute, they shall have due regard to their 
obligations and balance them accordingly, where applicable.95 The balancing ef-
fect of  this is to say that while there still exists a conflict of  obligation in this 
matter, African states should not ignore their obligations under the Rome Statute 
but should balance the two. This is to be taken to mean that, at the very least, 
these states should take measures to ensure that persons accused of  such heinous 
crimes under the Rome Statute do not enter their territory. 
The concerns that the AU, being a body that represents Africa as whole, 
have, need to be addressed too. Constant ignoring of  the concerns of  the body 
by the Security Council leads to a deeper rift in the relationship Africa has with 
the ICC and may have further implications as regards the continent, as well as the 
functioning of  the court, in the future.
The Rome Statute provides that 7 years after coming into force, the provi-
sions may be amended. Any member of  the ASP may propose amendments to 
the Rome Statute. The provisions as regards immunity need to be reviewed and 
amended in order to provide clarity in the application of  these provisions, to 
avoid future rifts. 
States should also refrain from direct attacks against the court. It should 
be noted that none of  the states were coerced into ratifying the Rome Statute. 
That being said, they should refrain from using politics as an excuse or cover-up 
for their disagreements with the court, when the working of  the court does not 
favour them. Threatening to withdraw from the statute of  the court could have 
extreme implications in the future and these should be considered carefully. 
94 ‘Jacobs D: Does South Africa have an obligation to arrest and surrender Bashir to the ICC? No’ 
Spreading the Jam, 14 June 2015 http://dovjacobs.com/2015/06/14/does-south-africa-have-an-obli-
gation-to-arrest-and-surrender-bashir-to-the-icc-no/ on 20 August 2015.
95 AU Assembly, Decision on the Meeting of  African States Parties to the Rome Statute of  the International Crimi-
nal Court, Assembly/AU/Dec.245 (XIII).
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VI. Conclusion
After consideration of  all the factors discussed in the paper, one thing 
that remains is that the African continent needs a system of  justice to deal with 
international crime. The importance of  a mechanism that ensures there is no 
impunity after crimes against humanity are committed is essential for the survival 
of  the continent as well as to ensure that justice is served. This paper however 
concedes that much needs to be done in pursuance of  this goal, for international 
criminal justice to prevail in society. 
Needless to say, the ICC is here to stay. It is not ‘dead’, as some may term it. 
Its importance to the continent cannot be trivialised. It is important that Africa 
works for an ICC that will work, rather than an ICC Africa wants. It is in order 
that, as a continent, we work well to improve our relationship with the court, for 
our own good. 
